Phil-Gong

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2011-05-14T17:16:00.004+10:00

Phil-Gong has moved to a new and improved site, where you can read about upcoming events in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong, and see what we're doing in our research and teaching as well. Visit us at:

uowphilosophy.wordpress.com

Philosophy Seminars in the Gong, Autumn 2011

2011-03-08T12:11:00.004+11:00

Our Philosophy Seminar Series is will start up again on March 16th, with our own Sarah Sorial (ARC Postdoctoral Research Fellow, UOW Philosophy/Law) presenting.

Title: Speech and the problem of harm

Abstract: This paper examines the question of whether speech can cause or constitute harm. Drawing on J.L. Austin and Rae Langton's respective accounts of authority, this paper offers a normative criterion with which to assess contested speech acts. I argue that the harm caused or constituted by speech is located in the authority of the speaker. The criteria developed is then applied to a number of difficult cases in order to demonstrate how it yields the right result.

Other speakers this term include David Neil (UOW), Maureen O'Malley (Sydney/Exeter), Rosalyn Diprose (UNSW), and Nicolas Bullot (Macquarie/MACCS).

Note that we've changed our seminar times to Wednesdays at 4:30, in the usual location - 19.1003. All are welcome to join us.

Philosophy @ UOW ranked alongside Monash, Melbourne, UNSW and Adelaide for Research Excellence

2011-02-01T13:54:00.004+11:00

We're very pleased with the results from the Australian Research Council's nationwide assessment of 'Research Excellence for Australia'. Philosophy at UOW earned a '4' on the 5 point scale, putting us in the company of Adelaide, La Trobe, Melbourne, Monash, UNSW and UQ and behind only ANU and Sydney. If you're looking to do high quality research in Philosophy in Australia, come to the Gong!

December Workshop: Expertise, Pedagogy, and Practice

2010-11-25T15:21:00.003+11:00

The Philosophy department at the University of Wollongong will be hosting a workshop on expertise, pedagogy, and practice on Dec 6-7, 2010. This workshop is supported through the ARC Discovery grant ‘Embodied Virtues and Expertise’ (DP1095109)

The workshop takes as its focus recent work on situated and embodied cognition, the concepts of expertise, skill and practice, and contemporary pedagogical theory. This work has made important steps towards overcoming traditional intellectualist and individualist models of cognition, group interaction and learning, but has in turn generated a number of important questions about the shape of a model that emphasizes learning and interaction as situated and embodied.

Speakers:

Christopher Winch (King’s College, London) – Education and Broad Concepts of Agency

David Beckett (Melbourne) – Beyond the Chicken Sexer: A Distributional Account of Expertise, Excellence and Agency

John Sutton (Macquarie) – Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: expertise and the transmission of embodied skills

Greg Downey (Macquarie) – tba

Paul Hager (UTS) – Group Practice: A Further Dimension of Expertise?

Mary Johnsson (UTS) – Dialogic Engagement: A Bakhtinian Perspective on Expert-Novice Interactions at Work

Nicola Johnson (Monash) – Problematising the label of ‘expert’ within education: Power, authority and discourse

David Simpson (Wollongong) – Wittgenstein and Stage-Setting: from natural reactions to the space of reasons

Michael Kirchhoff (Wollongong) – Extended Cognition and the ‘World is its Own Best Model’ Model of Cognition

Kellie Williamson (Macquarie) – Groups as Thinkers: Learning and Transactive Memory

Andrew Geeves (Macquarie) – Improvisation, rehearsal and temporality: the emergence of expertise within a group of professional musicians in an embodied and situated context

Full details, including abstracts, maps, transport and accommodation options, can be found here: http://bit.ly/abyoHI

There is no attendance fee, but to assist with catering arrangements, attendees must register by emailing David Simpson (dsimpson@uow.edu.au) by 28 Nov 2010

October Workshop: Levels of Explanation and Causation

2010-10-07T13:23:00.002+11:00

The Philosophy department at the University of Wollongong will be hosting a workshop on "Levels of Explanation and Causation" on October 15th-16th, 2010. Participants include Phil Dowe (UQ), Peter Menzies (Macquarie), and Jon Opie (Adelaide).

The focus of this workshop will be on questions such as what a level of explanation is, how the appropriate levels for explaining particular phenomena are identified, how causes and explanations at different levels relate to one another, and how arguments about levels of explanation and causation depend on the specific accounts of causation or explanation we adopt. The complete workshop schedule can be found at

http://bit.ly/uowlevels

All are welcome to attend. Registration is free, though there will be an optional fee to cover catering costs and a workshop dinner. If you are interested in attending, please contact Patrick McGivern at patrickm@uow.edu.au for more information.

Dominic Murphy in the Gong

2010-09-30T15:09:00.002+10:00

We're pleased to have Dominic Murphy (Sydney, HPS) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, October 5th. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Folk Epistemology and the Attribution of Delusion

Abstract: Philosophers, psychiatrists and psychologists have spent some time recently arguing about the concept of delusions, and how delusions might be explained. I will approach this topic from a different angle, and ask about the grounds for our attributing delusions. I suggest that we call a belief a delusion when it is inexplicable using the constraints of what I call 'folk epistemology'. Folk epistemology is a collection of common sense assumptions about the ways beliefs are caused. I suggest that understanding our attributions of delusions in this way solves some of the familiar puzzles about the concept of delusion, but it also suggests that delusions may not be a natural kind that can be given a unified scientific treatment.

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, October 5th in room 19.1003

Brett Calcott in the Gong

2010-09-17T21:47:00.001+10:00

We're pleased to have Brett Calcott (ANU) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, September 21st. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Evolvability as Inductive Learning

Abstract: In this paper, I construct an analogy between inductive learning and (one kind of) evolvability. Roughly, the analogy comes down to this: Just as we distinguish between smart and dumb creatures, we can distinguish between smart and dumb developmental systems. By a smart creature, I mean one that, because of its prior experience, will be more apt to generate a "good" guess in response to a new situation. By a smart developmental system, I mean one that, due to its previous selective regime, will be more apt to generate a "good" phenotype when presented with a new environment. So an evolvable developmental system, like a mind that uses induction, can generate good responses on the basis of prior experience. In the talk, I fill out the vague terms in this rough analogy, give a very general outline of the conditions under which smart developmental systems can occur, and look at a simple model showing one way it might work.

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, September 21st in room 19.1003

John Burgess and Shane Waugh in the Gong

2010-08-09T21:43:00.001+10:00

We're please to have John Burgess (Northwestern/UOW) and Shane Waugh (UOW) presenting a joint paper at the Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, August 10th. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Pluralism, Neutralism and Propositional Representation

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 10th in room 19.1003

*Back to our usual venue*

Abstract: Theories of interpretation which are duly sensitive to cultural and ideological diversity are usually sufficiently sophisticated to allow for error theoretic and fictionalist approaches to the areas of discourse which require them. Although a welcome step in the right direction, this is not yet sophistication enough; an adequate general account of interpretation must acknowledge the possibility of neutralist interpretation where we can understand a narrative without knowing whether it is fact, fiction or constitutively flawed would-be fact. Not only is this resource required for an adequate representation of interpretation in everyday life, it is also required in philosophy if we are properly to grasp the significance of positions like van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, Fogelin’s neo-Pyrhhonism and Kalderon’s moral fictionalism. We here develop and defend a position we call mode-variable realism. This task requires us first to explain neutralism and to show how it interacts with more familiar modes of interpretation to produce the mode-variable realist framework. Second, we apply the framework to the three philosophical examples just mentioned.

Ralph Wedgwood in the Gong

2010-07-29T12:42:00.004+10:00

We're pleased to have Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford) visiting us on Tuesday, August 3rd, to give a paper at our Research Seminar series.

Title: A Priori Bootstrapping

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 3rd in room 19.1038

*Note the change from our usual venue*

Abstract: This paper explores a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion of the paper is that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by arguing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it is a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.

The first section of the paper set outs the problem that this sceptical paradox raises for the justification of beliefs. The second section presents reasons for thinking that any adequate solution to this problem must claim that every thinker has a priori justification for believing that they are not in a sceptical scenario (i.e., a situation in which their experiences are in some undetectable way unreliable).

The third section describes a certain belief-forming practice, which we may call the practice of taking experience at face value. Given the assumption that this belief-forming practice is rational, there is a straightforward process of reasoning—the a priori bootstrapping reasoning—that can lead any thinker to a justified belief in the proposition that they are not in such a sceptical scenario.

As is explained in the fourth section, however, there is absolutely no prospect that this argument will be able to solve the problem that the sceptical paradox raises for the justification of belief-forming practices. So the deeper challenge of solving the practice for this belief-forming practice remains. Finally, some comments are made on the significance of these arguments for the idea of a priori reasoning, and for the attempts that other philosophers have made at solving the problems that are raised by the sceptical paradox.

Joanne Faulkner in the Gong

2010-05-17T13:32:00.004+10:00

We're pleased to Joanne Faulkner (UNSW) visiting us on Tuesday, May 18th, to give a paper at our Philosophy Research Seminar series.

Title: Vulnerability and the Passing of Childhood in Bill Henson: Innocence in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

When and Where: 5:30 pm, Tuesday, May 18th in room 19.1003

Abstract: The most public responses to Bill Henson's 2008 exhibition either judged the photographs to constitute child pornography (or a prelude to child abuse), or argued for the exemption of Henson's work from that field on the basis of its status as fine art. This paper interrogates these responses by asking what opportunities were missed amid the "controversy," for critical reflection on the political significance of childhood and of art. With reference to Walter Benjamin's reflections on art in the age of new technologies of reproduction, the paper attempts to re-situate Henson's 2008 work — and particularly the most controversial photograph within that exhibition — in the context of a broader 'crisis' in the (artistic) representation of children.

Paul Griffiths in the Gong

2010-05-04T15:49:00.004+10:00

We're very pleased to have Paul Griffiths (USyd) visiting us next week to give a paper in our Philosophy Research Seminar series. Paul will be speaking on May 11th, at 5:30 pm in the usual location (19.1003).

Title: "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?", co-authored with John Wilkins (Bond)

Abstract: Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? In this paper we apply this argument to beliefs in three different domains: morality, religion, and commonsense/science. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. The simplest reply to evolutionary scepticism is that the truth of beliefs in a certain domain is, in fact, connected to evolutionary success. So evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in that domain. We call a connection between truth and evolutionary success a 'Milvian bridge', after the tradition which ascribes the triumph of Christianity at the battle of the Milvian bridge to the truth of Christianity. We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary scepticism, which as been used to defend moral beliefs, is to argue that their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of affairs. We ask if this reply could be used to defend religious beliefs.

Kristie Miller in the Gong

2010-04-15T09:55:00.000+10:00

Kristie Miller (USyd) will be presenting at the University of Wollongong Philosophy Research Seminar series next Tuesday, April 20th, 5:30pm in room 19.1003. All are welcome to attend.

Title: "Motion, laws and plenitude: Are there objects to which the laws of nature do not apply?"

Abstract: It is a natural to assume that the domain of the concrete objects is coextensive with the domain of the objects to which the natural laws apply, and therefore that if we can find any concrete object that is at rest and does not stay at rest unless acted on by a net force, then we have found something that violates the law of inertia. Recently, however, this assumption has been challenged. The locus of this challenge has come from a number of metaphysicians who sign up for what I will call a plenitudinous ontology. Given a plenitudinous ontology, a great number of entities seem to be ones that violate one or other law of nature.Friends of plenitude have responded by conceding that the entities in question do violate the laws in question, and suggesting that the correct response is to distinguish two different kinds of concrete entity: the ones to which the laws apply, and the ones to which they do not. In this paper I advocate an alternative strategy according to which when the laws are properly understood, no concrete entity in the plenitudinous ontology ever violates those laws.

Brie Gertler in the Gong

2010-02-08T09:36:00.003+11:00

We're pleased to have Brie Gertler (University of Virginia) visiting us in Wollongong while she's a visiting fellow at the ANU this month. Brie's talk, "What we talk about when we talk about externalism" will be held on February 22nd at 5pm in our usual location (room 19.1003). (Note that this talk is on a Monday instead of the usual Tuesday time-slot).

This will be the first in our Autumn 2010 series of Philosophy talks at UOW: look for news on the rest of the Autumn schedule here soon.

Embodied, Enactive, and Extended in the Gong

2009-11-20T09:43:00.004+11:00

December 10th-11th, we're hosting a workshop on embodied, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition. Participants include Wayne Christensen, Shaun Gallagher, Dan Hutto, Ben Jeffares, Richard Menary, David Simpson, Kim Sterelny, Karola Stotz, and John Sutton. The program and further details are available here. Contact Richard Menary if you're interested in attending.

November events at UOW

2009-11-09T09:37:00.002+11:00

Stephen Hetherington is visiting us from UNSW tomorrow (Tuesday, November 10th), speaking at the usual time and place (5:30pm, 19.1003). Last week was very busy, philosophically: Neil Levy visited on Tuesday to speak on neural ethics, politics, and extended minds, and then Thursday-Friday Sarah Sorial hosted a very successful workshop on Political Violence, which included talks by Tony Coady, Catriona MacKenzie, David Neil, Jacqui Poltera, and Igor Primoratz, as well as Sarah herself.

December 10-11th we're hosting another workshop, this time on Embodied Cognition, Enactivism, adn the Extended Mind. Speakers include Wayne Christensen, Shaun Gallagher, Daniel Hutto, Ben Jeffares, Richard Menary, David Simpson, Kim Sterelny, Karola Stotz, and John Sutton.

If you're coming from Sydney, you can easily get here by train. Take the South Coast line to North Wollongong station, and then a free shuttle bus to campus. See the links at the side for more information and maps.

October Events at UOW

2009-09-24T11:10:00.006+10:00

October will be a busy month for philosophy at UOW. We have four speakers scheduled for our Philosophy Research Seminar: Peter Slezak (UNSW) on October 6th, Keith Horton (UOW) on October 13th, Jacqui Poltera (UWS) on October 20th, and Jordi Fernandez (Adelaide) on October 27th -- see the calendar for abstracts and further details.

Before we get to October, we have the Expertise, Skill and Pedagogy workshop on September 25th in room 30.111 -- see below for the program and abstracts of papers.

We'll have more events in November and December, including Neil Levy (Melbourne/CAPPE/Oxford) on November 3rd and Stephen Hetherington (UNSW) on November 10th and our Embodied Cognition workshop in December. All are welcome!

UOW Workshop: Expertise, Skill and Pedagogy

2009-09-17T15:04:00.003+10:00

Friday 25 September, room 30.111

Recent work in philosophy and education theory has seen a growing interest in the concepts of skill and expertise. Drawing on work of, for example, Ryle, Dreyfus, Bourdieu and Wittgenstein, and on recent developments in cognitive science, theorists have been developing alternatives to the intellectualist-individualist-disembodied paradigm that has long dominated work on cognition, learning and interaction. The move to a perspective that takes the thinking, learning subject as primarily engaged and embodied has profound implications for our understanding of teaching and learning, and of cognition more generally. These developments in philosophy and education have tended to proceed in isolation, however, and this workshop will provide an opportunity to bring the two strands together, to examine differences and similarities of approach, and to explore the possibilities of collaboration across discipline areas.

The workshop is open to all.

View abstracts and bios of the papers and presenters.

Program

9:00 WELCOME AND COFFEE
9:30 – 10:45 David Beckett (Education, University of Melbourne): Climbing the Ladder – and Kicking it Away: How Inferential Understanding Can Grow Expertise
10:45 – 11:00 MORNING TEA
11:00 – 12:15 Richard Menary (Philosophy, University of Wollongong): Representational Intentionality and Motor Intentionality: What are their respective roles in skilled Activity?
12:15 – 1:30 LUNCH
1:30 – 2:45 Wilma Vialle & Irina Verenikina (Education, University of Wollongong): The development of expertise in communities of practice
2:45 – 4:00 David Simpson (Philosophy, University of Wollongong): Ryle, Skill, and Embodiment
4:00 – 4:15 AFTERNOON TEA
4:15 – 5:30 Nicola Johnson (Education, University of Wollongong): A sociological view of technological expertise

For further information, please contact:

David Simpson
Philosophy
Rm. 19.1101
Ext 3620
dsimpson@uow.edu.au

Sept 8th talk cancelled

2009-09-08T10:22:00.002+10:00

Unfortunately, today's seminar talk by Stephen Hetherington has been cancelled. Hopefully we'll be able to reschedule for another time later this year.

Stephen Hetherington @ UOW

2009-09-04T15:28:00.004+10:00

On September 8th, Dr. Stephen Hetherington (UNSW) will be speaking on "Scepticism as an Intellectualist Mistake" at 5:30 in room 19.1003 at UOW. All are welcome.

Abstract: How many philosophers have claimed to uncover a fundamental failing within sceptical thinking about knowledge? All too many; perhaps the quest is foolhardy. Maybe irrationally undaunted, though, this paper joins that fray — armed with the Rylean distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how. The paper’s conclusion is that sceptical thinking which would deny us knowledge relies upon a mistaken metaphysical presumption about the nature of knowledge and knowing.

Philosophy @ UOW

2009-09-04T14:16:00.008+10:00

Philosophers and philosophy seminars at UOW can be found in building 19. Seminars are usually held on Tuesdays, starting at 17:30 in room 1003.

View UOW Philosophy in a larger map

Welcome to Phil-Gong

2009-08-31T10:01:00.001+10:00

Welcome to Phil-Gong, where you can read about philosophy events in and around Wollongong, NSW.