We're pleased to have Dominic Murphy (Sydney, HPS) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, October 5th. All are welcome to attend.
Title: Folk Epistemology and the Attribution of Delusion
Abstract: Philosophers, psychiatrists and psychologists have spent some time recently arguing about the concept of delusions, and how delusions might be explained. I will approach this topic from a different angle, and ask about the grounds for our attributing delusions. I suggest that we call a belief a delusion when it is inexplicable using the constraints of what I call 'folk epistemology'. Folk epistemology is a collection of common sense assumptions about the ways beliefs are caused. I suggest that understanding our attributions of delusions in this way solves some of the familiar puzzles about the concept of delusion, but it also suggests that delusions may not be a natural kind that can be given a unified scientific treatment.
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, October 5th in room 19.1003
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Friday, September 17, 2010
Brett Calcott in the Gong
We're pleased to have Brett Calcott (ANU) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, September 21st. All are welcome to attend.
Title: Evolvability as Inductive Learning
Abstract: In this paper, I construct an analogy between inductive learning and (one kind of) evolvability. Roughly, the analogy comes down to this: Just as we distinguish between smart and dumb creatures, we can distinguish between smart and dumb developmental systems. By a smart creature, I mean one that, because of its prior experience, will be more apt to generate a "good" guess in response to a new situation. By a smart developmental system, I mean one that, due to its previous selective regime, will be more apt to generate a "good" phenotype when presented with a new environment. So an evolvable developmental system, like a mind that uses induction, can generate good responses on the basis of prior experience. In the talk, I fill out the vague terms in this rough analogy, give a very general outline of the conditions under which smart developmental systems can occur, and look at a simple model showing one way it might work.
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, September 21st in room 19.1003
Title: Evolvability as Inductive Learning
Abstract: In this paper, I construct an analogy between inductive learning and (one kind of) evolvability. Roughly, the analogy comes down to this: Just as we distinguish between smart and dumb creatures, we can distinguish between smart and dumb developmental systems. By a smart creature, I mean one that, because of its prior experience, will be more apt to generate a "good" guess in response to a new situation. By a smart developmental system, I mean one that, due to its previous selective regime, will be more apt to generate a "good" phenotype when presented with a new environment. So an evolvable developmental system, like a mind that uses induction, can generate good responses on the basis of prior experience. In the talk, I fill out the vague terms in this rough analogy, give a very general outline of the conditions under which smart developmental systems can occur, and look at a simple model showing one way it might work.
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, September 21st in room 19.1003
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