December Workshop: Expertise, Pedagogy, and Practice

The Philosophy department at the University of Wollongong will be hosting a workshop on expertise, pedagogy, and practice on Dec 6-7, 2010. This workshop is supported through the ARC Discovery grant ‘Embodied Virtues and Expertise’ (DP1095109)

The workshop takes as its focus recent work on situated and embodied cognition, the concepts of expertise, skill and practice, and contemporary pedagogical theory. This work has made important steps towards overcoming traditional intellectualist and individualist models of cognition, group interaction and learning, but has in turn generated a number of important questions about the shape of a model that emphasizes learning and interaction as situated and embodied.

Speakers:

Christopher Winch (King’s College, London) – Education and Broad Concepts of Agency

David Beckett (Melbourne) – Beyond the Chicken Sexer: A Distributional Account of Expertise, Excellence and Agency

John Sutton (Macquarie) – Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: expertise and the transmission of embodied skills

Greg Downey (Macquarie) – tba

Paul Hager (UTS) – Group Practice: A Further Dimension of Expertise?

Mary Johnsson (UTS) – Dialogic Engagement: A Bakhtinian Perspective on Expert-Novice Interactions at Work

Nicola Johnson (Monash) – Problematising the label of ‘expert’ within education: Power, authority and discourse

David Simpson (Wollongong) – Wittgenstein and Stage-Setting: from natural reactions to the space of reasons

Michael Kirchhoff (Wollongong) – Extended Cognition and the ‘World is its Own Best Model’ Model of Cognition

Kellie Williamson (Macquarie) – Groups as Thinkers: Learning and Transactive Memory

Andrew Geeves (Macquarie) – Improvisation, rehearsal and temporality: the emergence of expertise within a group of professional musicians in an embodied and situated context

Full details, including abstracts, maps, transport and accommodation options, can be found here: http://bit.ly/abyoHI

There is no attendance fee, but to assist with catering arrangements, attendees must register by emailing David Simpson (dsimpson@uow.edu.au) by 28 Nov 2010

October Workshop: Levels of Explanation and Causation

The Philosophy department at the University of Wollongong will be hosting a workshop on "Levels of Explanation and Causation" on October 15th-16th, 2010. Participants include Phil Dowe (UQ), Peter Menzies (Macquarie), and Jon Opie (Adelaide).

The focus of this workshop will be on questions such as what a level of explanation is, how the appropriate levels for explaining particular phenomena are identified, how causes and explanations at different levels relate to one another, and how arguments about levels of explanation and causation depend on the specific accounts of causation or explanation we adopt. The complete workshop schedule can be found at

http://bit.ly/uowlevels

All are welcome to attend. Registration is free, though there will be an optional fee to cover catering costs and a workshop dinner. If you are interested in attending, please contact Patrick McGivern at patrickm@uow.edu.au for more information.

Dominic Murphy in the Gong

We're pleased to have Dominic Murphy (Sydney, HPS) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, October 5th. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Folk Epistemology and the Attribution of Delusion

Abstract: Philosophers, psychiatrists and psychologists have spent some time recently arguing about the concept of delusions, and how delusions might be explained. I will approach this topic from a different angle, and ask about the grounds for our attributing delusions. I suggest that we call a belief a delusion when it is inexplicable using the constraints of what I call 'folk epistemology'. Folk epistemology is a collection of common sense assumptions about the ways beliefs are caused. I suggest that understanding our attributions of delusions in this way solves some of the familiar puzzles about the concept of delusion, but it also suggests that delusions may not be a natural kind that can be given a unified scientific treatment.

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, October 5th in room 19.1003

Brett Calcott in the Gong

We're pleased to have Brett Calcott (ANU) presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, September 21st. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Evolvability as Inductive Learning

Abstract: In this paper, I construct an analogy between inductive learning and (one kind of) evolvability. Roughly, the analogy comes down to this: Just as we distinguish between smart and dumb creatures, we can distinguish between smart and dumb developmental systems. By a smart creature, I mean one that, because of its prior experience, will be more apt to generate a "good" guess in response to a new situation. By a smart developmental system, I mean one that, due to its previous selective regime, will be more apt to generate a "good" phenotype when presented with a new environment. So an evolvable developmental system, like a mind that uses induction, can generate good responses on the basis of prior experience. In the talk, I fill out the vague terms in this rough analogy, give a very general outline of the conditions under which smart developmental systems can occur, and look at a simple model showing one way it might work.

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, September 21st in room 19.1003

John Burgess and Shane Waugh in the Gong

We're please to have John Burgess (Northwestern/UOW) and Shane Waugh (UOW) presenting a joint paper at the Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, August 10th. All are welcome to attend.

Title: Pluralism, Neutralism and Propositional Representation

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 10th in room 19.1003

*Back to our usual venue*

Abstract: Theories of interpretation which are duly sensitive to cultural and ideological diversity are usually sufficiently sophisticated to allow for error theoretic and fictionalist approaches to the areas of discourse which require them. Although a welcome step in the right direction, this is not yet sophistication enough; an adequate general account of interpretation must acknowledge the possibility of neutralist interpretation where we can understand a narrative without knowing whether it is fact, fiction or constitutively flawed would-be fact. Not only is this resource required for an adequate representation of interpretation in everyday life, it is also required in philosophy if we are properly to grasp the significance of positions like van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, Fogelin’s neo-Pyrhhonism and Kalderon’s moral fictionalism. We here develop and defend a position we call mode-variable realism. This task requires us first to explain neutralism and to show how it interacts with more familiar modes of interpretation to produce the mode-variable realist framework. Second, we apply the framework to the three philosophical examples just mentioned.

Ralph Wedgwood in the Gong

We're pleased to have Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford) visiting us on Tuesday, August 3rd, to give a paper at our Research Seminar series.

Title: A Priori Bootstrapping

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 3rd in room 19.1038

*Note the change from our usual venue*

Abstract: This paper explores a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion of the paper is that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by arguing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it is a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.

The first section of the paper set outs the problem that this sceptical paradox raises for the justification of beliefs. The second section presents reasons for thinking that any adequate solution to this problem must claim that every thinker has a priori justification for believing that they are not in a sceptical scenario (i.e., a situation in which their experiences are in some undetectable way unreliable).

The third section describes a certain belief-forming practice, which we may call the practice of taking experience at face value. Given the assumption that this belief-forming practice is rational, there is a straightforward process of reasoning—the a priori bootstrapping reasoning—that can lead any thinker to a justified belief in the proposition that they are not in such a sceptical scenario.

As is explained in the fourth section, however, there is absolutely no prospect that this argument will be able to solve the problem that the sceptical paradox raises for the justification of belief-forming practices. So the deeper challenge of solving the practice for this belief-forming practice remains. Finally, some comments are made on the significance of these arguments for the idea of a priori reasoning, and for the attempts that other philosophers have made at solving the problems that are raised by the sceptical paradox.

Joanne Faulkner in the Gong

We're pleased to Joanne Faulkner (UNSW) visiting us on Tuesday, May 18th, to give a paper at our Philosophy Research Seminar series.

Title: Vulnerability and the Passing of Childhood in Bill Henson: Innocence in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

When and Where: 5:30 pm, Tuesday, May 18th in room 19.1003

Abstract: The most public responses to Bill Henson's 2008 exhibition either judged the photographs to constitute child pornography (or a prelude to child abuse), or argued for the exemption of Henson's work from that field on the basis of its status as fine art. This paper interrogates these responses by asking what opportunities were missed amid the "controversy," for critical reflection on the political significance of childhood and of art. With reference to Walter Benjamin's reflections on art in the age of new technologies of reproduction, the paper attempts to re-situate Henson's 2008 work — and particularly the most controversial photograph within that exhibition — in the context of a broader 'crisis' in the (artistic) representation of children.

Paul Griffiths in the Gong

We're very pleased to have Paul Griffiths (USyd) visiting us next week to give a paper in our Philosophy Research Seminar series. Paul will be speaking on May 11th, at 5:30 pm in the usual location (19.1003).

Title: "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?", co-authored with John Wilkins (Bond)

Abstract: Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? In this paper we apply this argument to beliefs in three different domains: morality, religion, and commonsense/science. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. The simplest reply to evolutionary scepticism is that the truth of beliefs in a certain domain is, in fact, connected to evolutionary success. So evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in that domain. We call a connection between truth and evolutionary success a 'Milvian bridge', after the tradition which ascribes the triumph of Christianity at the battle of the Milvian bridge to the truth of Christianity. We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary scepticism, which as been used to defend moral beliefs, is to argue that their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of affairs. We ask if this reply could be used to defend religious beliefs.

Kristie Miller in the Gong

Kristie Miller (USyd) will be presenting at the University of Wollongong Philosophy Research Seminar series next Tuesday, April 20th, 5:30pm in room 19.1003. All are welcome to attend.

Title: "Motion, laws and plenitude: Are there objects to which the laws of nature do not apply?"

Abstract: It is a natural to assume that the domain of the concrete objects is coextensive with the domain of the objects to which the natural laws apply, and therefore that if we can find any concrete object that is at rest and does not stay at rest unless acted on by a net force, then we have found something that violates the law of inertia. Recently, however, this assumption has been challenged. The locus of this challenge has come from a number of metaphysicians who sign up for what I will call a plenitudinous ontology. Given a plenitudinous ontology, a great number of entities seem to be ones that violate one or other law of nature.Friends of plenitude have responded by conceding that the entities in question do violate the laws in question, and suggesting that the correct response is to distinguish two different kinds of concrete entity: the ones to which the laws apply, and the ones to which they do not. In this paper I advocate an alternative strategy according to which when the laws are properly understood, no concrete entity in the plenitudinous ontology ever violates those laws.

Brie Gertler in the Gong

We're pleased to have Brie Gertler (University of Virginia) visiting us in Wollongong while she's a visiting fellow at the ANU this month. Brie's talk, "What we talk about when we talk about externalism" will be held on February 22nd at 5pm in our usual location (room 19.1003). (Note that this talk is on a Monday instead of the usual Tuesday time-slot).

This will be the first in our Autumn 2010 series of Philosophy talks at UOW: look for news on the rest of the Autumn schedule here soon.