Ralph Wedgwood in the Gong

We're pleased to have Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford) visiting us on Tuesday, August 3rd, to give a paper at our Research Seminar series.

Title: A Priori Bootstrapping

When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 3rd in room 19.1038

*Note the change from our usual venue*

Abstract: This paper explores a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion of the paper is that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by arguing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it is a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.

The first section of the paper set outs the problem that this sceptical paradox raises for the justification of beliefs. The second section presents reasons for thinking that any adequate solution to this problem must claim that every thinker has a priori justification for believing that they are not in a sceptical scenario (i.e., a situation in which their experiences are in some undetectable way unreliable).

The third section describes a certain belief-forming practice, which we may call the practice of taking experience at face value. Given the assumption that this belief-forming practice is rational, there is a straightforward process of reasoning—the a priori bootstrapping reasoning—that can lead any thinker to a justified belief in the proposition that they are not in such a sceptical scenario.

As is explained in the fourth section, however, there is absolutely no prospect that this argument will be able to solve the problem that the sceptical paradox raises for the justification of belief-forming practices. So the deeper challenge of solving the practice for this belief-forming practice remains. Finally, some comments are made on the significance of these arguments for the idea of a priori reasoning, and for the attempts that other philosophers have made at solving the problems that are raised by the sceptical paradox.